I. INTRODUCTION The 30th anniversary of the Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada
1 is an opportunity to reflect on Canada's constitutional tradition. In character, reasoning and outcome, the Patriation Reference seems to be quintessentially Canadian. It is of course most famous for articulating a constitutional convention requiring substantial provincial consent for amendments affecting provincial powers; and only slightly less famous for considering a question about conventions at all. Many have criticized it as a political manoeuvre that is neither supportable nor particularly subtle. 2 While conventions are a fascinating topic, especially in light of recent events, 3 in this paper I propose to examine the Patriation Reference in a different vein, namely, as a paradigmatic example of the reference function. In this way, I hope to evaluate its broader impact on Canadian constitutional law. 52. It shall be lawful for the Governor in Council to refer to the Supreme Court for hearing or consideration, any matters whatsoever as he may think fit; and the Court shall thereupon hear and consider the same and certify their opinion thereon to the Governor in Council: Provided that any Judge or Judges of the said Court who may differ from the opinion of the majority may in like manner certify his or their opinion or opinions to the Governor in Council. 10 Section 52 soon proved inadequate because the Supreme Court took the view that it need only state a bare answer without reasons.
11 Depending on the specificity of the question, this obviously could fail to provide suitable guidance. For example, in the McCarthy Act Reference 12 the Supreme Court found a federal liquor law to be ultra vires without explaining why, thus leaving the federal government without a sufficient basis to know how to proceed.
The situation was deemed unacceptable, and the Act was amended in 1891. Many of the changes made survive to the present day. The Court was to "hear and consider [the reference], and to answer each question so referred"; and to certify "its opinion upon each such question, with the reasons for each such answer". The opinion was to be "pronounced in like manner as in the case of a judgment upon an appeal to the Court"; and any dissenting opinions were to be recorded. The Act elaborated, as well, on the questions that could be put to the Court: 7 3&4 Wm. IV, c. 41. Id., s. 52. Section 53 provided a similar power for either chamber of the House of Commons to refer private bills. While it survives to the present day (see Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 54), this second reference power has fallen into disuse. In my opinion, this is unfortunate.
11
Strayer, supra, note 8, at 312. In fairness, the J.C.P.C. apparently agreed, which, given the history of references in England, is difficult to explain. The Court also could notify any parties it thought fit to be present. The one element in 1891 that was subsequently abandoned was a clause deeming opinions to be "advisory only". For all purposes of appeal, though, the opinion was to be treated as a final judgment. of the respective governments thereof, whether or not the particular power in question has been or is proposed to be exercised. (2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning any matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court ejusdem generis with the enumerations contained in subsection (1), with reference to which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit any such question.
….. (4) Where a reference is made to the Court under subsection (1) or (2), it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to answer each question so referred, and the Court shall certify to the Governor in Council, for his information, its opinion on each question, with the reasons for each answer, and the opinion shall be pronounced in like manner as The first challenge to the reference power came from the provinces, which viewed it as conferring an unfair federal advantage. This concern was recognized in 1891 when the Act was amended to provide for automatic notice to affected provinces, as well an automatic right to appear. Yet the provinces continued to have grave concerns, as articulated in Reference re References, 14 which involved a federal question about the provincial power to incorporate companies. Six provinces contested the hearing, arguing first that it offended the division of powers for the federal government to refer questions of law concerning provincial matters; and, second, that the reference power was incompatible with the nature of a "general court of appeal" as provided for in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
15
With respect to the division of powers argument, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the use in section 101 of the words "a general court of appeal" was broad enough to encompass the reference jurisdiction, and that nothing in the Constitution Act, 1867 suggested that the jurisdiction exists only with respect to questions of federal law. 16 On appeal, the J.C.P.C. did not specifically canvass the argument but its reference to the numerous examples of identical legislation in the provinces suggests that it found the alleged concern artificial. The J.C.P.C. summarized the provincial argument regarding the proper function of a court as follows:
[The reference provision] … purports to create a Court … as a branch of the Executive Government, an advisory committee for the purpose of in the case of a judgment on an appeal to the Court, and any judges who differ from the opinion of the majority shall in like manner certify their opinions and their reasons.
(5) Where the question relates to the constitutional validity of any Act passed by the legislature of any province, or of any provision in any such Act, or in case, for any reason, the government of any province has any special interest in any such question, the attorney general of the province shall be notified of the hearing in order that the attorney general may be heard if he thinks fit.
(6) The Court has power to direct that any person interested or, where there is a class of persons interested, any one or more persons as representatives of that class shall be notified of the hearing on any reference under this section, and those persons are entitled to be heard thereon.
(7) The Court may, in its discretion, request any counsel to argue the case with respect to any interest that is affected and with respect to which counsel does not appear, and the reasonable expenses thereby occasioned may be paid by the Minister of Finance out of any moneys appropriated by Parliament for expenses of litigation.
14 Supra, note 6. advising the Executive upon any question which the Governor-General sees fit to refer to it. The giving of such advice is no part of the administration of the law, and it would necessarily include, inter alia, advice upon the legislation of the Imperial Parliament and of the various provincial Legislatures in Canada. So far from aiding in the administration of law it may easily be so used as to hamper and interfere with that administration. ... It was contended that it would or might be highly prejudicial to the administration of justice that the members of the Supreme Court should have been previously required to express opinions upon any such points until they actually arose for adjudication and had been argued before them. ... The obligation is inconsistent with the primary duty of the Court and the purpose for which it was created, namely, the administration of law. So far as that administration is impeded or overridden by the obligation imposed by [the provision] the Court ceases to be such a judiciary as the Constitution provides for. One is struck by the similarity between such arguments and those that are commonly raised in the United States against the perils of an unrestrained judiciary. The argument relies on a more rigid separation of powers, albeit in the clear furtherance of regional interests. The J.C.P.C. first noted that the division of powers is exhaustive of all potential legislative authority in a given system. No power can be unavailable to both levels of government. While the Constitution's express words do not mention a judicial reference function, the Committee found that it clearly contemplates an institution which is capable of rendering such opinions -the Supreme Court -and allocates the power to establish that Court to the federal Parliament. The Committee dismissed the objection that a reference function is incompatible with judicial character, noting that such a power was well-established (if infrequently used) within British constitutionalism; and that numerous references already had been appealed to the Privy Council without such concerns having been raised.
Canadian courts, then, largely accepted the reference function as an appropriate extension of their duties. Rather than functioning only as a "check" on the executive branch, the judiciary was viewed as occasionally aligned 18 with the executive branch.
17
Id., at para. 4. 19 a jurisdictional objection was couched on the grounds that the reference was actually an appeal of a criminal case. Although sympathetic to the provinces' concern, Justice Girouard concluded that "as our advice has no legal effect, does not affect the rights of parties, nor the provincial decisions, and is not even binding upon us", 20 he had no objection to answering the questions. Justice Davies made the same point in Reference re References: "Being advisory only and not binding upon the body to whom they are given [the Governor General in Council] or upon the judges who give them they cannot be said to be in any way binding upon the judges of any of the provincial courts."
21
In 1910 the Chief Justice of Canada said that it was unthinkable that the Court would consider itself bound by its reference opinions. 22 This, though, is precisely what happened. For decades the Supreme Court followed the decisions in earlier federal references with "undiscriminating zeal". 23 Not until 1957 did the Supreme Court suggest that a reference opinion does not trigger the rule of res judicata with respect to future litigation in respect of the same subject. 24 Of course, the absence of res judicata simply means that a case can proceed. It does not decide the persuasive value of the previous opinion. (Indeed, in the 1957 case the Supreme Court followed the rule laid down by the J.C.P.C.) Thus, by the time of the Patriation Reference, the notion that references were strictly advisory was correct only as a matter of pure constitutional law. Invariably references were treated as having the force of law. No government had ever treated a reference as "mere advice". Id., at 436; Reference re References, supra, note 6, at 561 (S.C.C.).
Reference re References, id., at 561.
22
Reference re Criminal Code, supra, note 19, at 550. In view of how the reference function evolved in Canada, it is inevitable that such opinions would receive deference even from courts. The 1891 amendments to the Supreme Court Act clarified the procedure in such a way as to render references virtually indistinguishable from cases. Notice was required, pleadings were made and, most importantly, reasons were given. Consider, for example, the Motor Vehicle Reference 26 (which struck down most absolute liability offences) and the judgment in Vaillancourt 27 (which struck down the felony murder rule). In terms of their content, structure and reasoning one is hard pressed to find many differences between them. In each, the Court appears to be performing the same function: identifying broad principles and applying them to produce a particular legal rule. Since the government is presumed to not want an unconstitutional law to stand once the Court has identified the "correct" legal answer, that would tend to settle the matter no matter the specific provenance of that conclusion.
Because they involve a question of the Executive's choosing, references are inconsistent with a strict separation of powers. 28 And, since references are decided in the absence of a concrete case, it can be difficult to constrain their scope (normally, a power the Court enjoys when it sets constitutional questions). In Reference re References the J.C.P.C. noted "the mischief and inconvenience which might arise from an indiscriminate and injudicious use of the Act". 29 Over time, the Supreme Court has articulated circumstances in which it may qualify or refuse to answer a question: insufficient factual context; 30 mootness;
31
[hereinafter "Senate Reference"]). Indeed, the fact that the Supreme Court Act no longer refers to such opinions as "advisory" might cast doubt upon the latter assertion. Given the special nature of references it must be recognized that the federal Cabinet enjoys a particular power -to refer questions to the Court, and treat the answer as binding -that align the executive and the Court, against the legislative branch and, indeed, against the provinces (although this latter concern was addressed early on in the Supreme Court Act, which now allows for appeals of provincial advisory opinions). The risk of inappropriate alignment between the executive and judiciary is somewhat mitigated by the authority of either house of the legislature to refer private bills to the Court: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 54. However, this power has fallen into disuse and, in any case, does not extend to government bills. Another possible approach is to treat references like the function currently performed by the British courts in respect of cases arising under the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42, s. 4, where the courts' decisions are declaratory only.
29
Reference re References, supra, note 6, at para. 16 (P.C.). lack of specificity; 32 vagueness; 33 and the risk that the opinion will produce legal uncertainty. 34 The categories are rarely invoked, but, given that they are nowhere found in the Supreme Court Act, the Court in carving them out appears to be relying on separation of powers principles.
Thus, by 1981 the advisory opinion was firmly entrenched in Canada, and occupied a significant portion of the Court's docket. 35 Early changes to the Supreme Court Act ensured that references would take the same form as cases. Certain parties enjoyed statutory rights of participation, and others could be granted standing. Evidence could be received, pleadings prepared, amici appointed and reasons would always be forthcoming. The opinions were also frequently divided, further belying any argument that references are different from cases.
III. THE REFERENCE -SOME OBSERVATIONS By 1981 the provinces enjoyed a co-equal ability with Canada to initiate references. While provinces cannot refer questions directly to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court Act permits an appeal as of right from reference opinions issued in provincial courts. At least half of all references in the Supreme Court concern provincially initiated questions.
36
The provinces had long argued that their interests and standing in Confederation could be overborne by an indifferent or even hostile federal government. That government's decision to proceed unilaterally with a resolution to amend the Constitution could not have better illustrated the point. In considering their options, the provinces realized that a reference might be an effective political tool. 37 They could bring the question of the appropriate conditions for constitutional change into the public spotlight.
38 By duplicating proceedings, those provinces Id., at 763. I will not discuss this question further.
42
Id.
43
Supra, note 25. Court. The government of Canada argued that the proposed changes lay within its exclusive authority under the former section 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 45 Under that subsection Parliament enjoyed an amending power, but it was subject to numerous exceptions including any amendments to "matters coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or privileges … granted or secured to the Legislature or the Government of a province". 46 The Supreme Court found that an affirmative answer to the questions 47 presupposed a federal power to abolish the Senate of Canada. This, Parliament could not do. 48 The Court noted that section 91(1) was instituted in 1949 to obviate the need for the U.K. Parliament's consent on "federal 'housekeeping'" matters that historically had been "obtained through a joint resolution of both Houses of Parliament and without provincial consent". 49 The exceptions contained therein proved that amendments touching federal-provincial relations could not be achieved through unilateral federal action:
The legislation contemplated in [this reference] is of an entirely different character [than federal "housekeeping" matters]. While it does not directly affect … federal and provincial legislative powers, it does envision the elimination of one of the two Houses of Parliament, and so would alter the structure of the federal Parliament to which the federal power to legislate is entrusted under s. 91 of the Act.
50
More significant for the Patriation Reference was the Court's assertion that when a proposed constitutional amendment would affect provincial powers or status, history showed a high degree of provincial involvement. The Court noted with apparent approval four principles from a 1965 federal White Paper:
[First] … that although an enactment by the United Kingdom is necessary to amend the British North America Act, such action is taken only upon formal request from Canada. No Act of the United Kingdom Parliament affecting Canada is therefore passed unless it is requested and consented to by Canada. Conversely, every amendment requested by Canada in the past has been enacted. Id.
47
The Court also found that several of the sub-questions in Question 2 failed to present "a factual context in which to formulate a satisfactory answer". Senate Reference, supra, note 25, at 77. It therefore declined to answer questions 2(a), (c), (d) and (e)(i) to (iv).
48
Id., at 74.
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Id., at 65. The fourth principle would prove to be a point of contention in the Patriation Reference. Turning now to the Patriation Reference itself, one is struck by the deep divisions it revealed among the justices. The Court considered an appeal from three provincial references, with questions that were carefully tailored to provoke maximum impact. Because none of the justices declined to play along, and because the Court clearly had its own internal divisions, the result was highly fractured, even confusing.
The Court considered three principal issues. 52 Questions 1 53 and A 54 posed a deceptively simple question regarding the impact of the proposed constitutional amendments on provincial powers (variously referred to as "federal-provincial relations", "powers, rights or privileges", "legislative competence" and "status"). Declining to answer, the Manitoba Court of Appeal described Question 1 as "premature":
We … face a real likelihood that the amendments sought in the Proposed Resolution may be altered, deleted, or supplanted by other amendments before the Resolution is deemed ready for transmission to Her Majesty. In this situation there is a danger that if we answer Question 1, with the proposed amendments in their present form, we may later find that we have answered matters no longer before us and have not answered matters that emerged in their stead. The Court should not be exposed to the risk of such an adventure in futility. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal, while noting the concerns, nonetheless answered the question 56 as did the Quebec Court of Appeal.
57
The Supreme Court did not spend much time at all on these questions, with all of the justices answering them in the affirmative. Nonetheless, the questions highlighted the fact that a major change to the Constitution of Canada was being pursued by the federal government that would negatively redound to provincial rights. The questions invoked the historic provincial concerns already discussed earlier in this paper -a potent argument in a number of regions across the country and even beyond.
The second issue concerned the federal government's authority to unilaterally pursue constitutional change that affects existing provincial powers. The issue was captured by Question 3 of the Manitoba/Newfoundland References, and part of Question B of the Quebec Reference. It was expressed most clearly as follows in Question 3:
Is the agreement of the provinces of Canada constitutionally required for amendment to the Constitution of Canada where such amendment affects federal-provincial relationships or alters the powers, rights or privileges granted or secured by the Constitution of Canada to the provinces, their legislatures or governments? 58 It should be noted, though, that the question involves the ability of the federal government to initiate the amendment process by submitting resolutions to the U.K. Parliament. A majority of the Court clarified that it was dealing only with the federal government's discretion to make a request, not with any subsequent reaction to that request by Westminster. 59 In other words, the majority confined the issue to the scope of Parliament's power to pass any resolution. It found no inherent limit, and Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 774: Two observations are pertinent here. First, we have the anomaly that although Canada has international recognition as an independent, autonomous and self-governing state, as, for example, a founding member of the United Nations, and through membership in other international associations of sovereign states, yet it suffers from an internal deficiency in the absence of legal power to alter or amend the essential distributive arrangements under which legal authority is exercised in the country, whether at the federal or provincial level. When a country has been in existence as an operating federal state for more than a century, the task of introducing a legal mechanism that will thereafter remove the anomaly undoubtedly raises a profound problem. Secondly, the authority of the British Parliament or its practices and conventions are not matters upon which this Court would presume to pronounce. The stark legal question is whether this Court can enact by what would be judicial legislation a formula of unanimity to initiate the amending process which would be binding not only in Canada but also on the Parliament of the United Kingdom with which amending authority would still remain. It would be anomalous indeed, over-shadowing the anomaly of a constitution which contains no provision for its amendment, for this Court to say retroactively that in law we have had an amending formula all along, even if we have not hitherto known it. ... No one can gainsay the desirability of federal-provincial accord or acceptable compromise. That does not, however, go to legality. As Sir William Jowitt said, and quoted earlier, we must operate the old machinery perhaps one more time.
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The majority therefore concluded that there was no legal impediment to the federal government proceeding unilaterally.
Dissenting, Martland and Ritchie JJ. approached the question differently. Rather than asking whether it would constitute a breach of the law for Parliament to make the resolution, they asked whether Parliament possessed the legal authority to pass a resolution which would lead to fundamental changes to provincial powers. 62 Noting the issue's "unique" 63 character, they found such an action to be inconsistent with federalism. The federal government could not use its procedural advantage (namely, that it alone can "request" constitutional amendments) to bring about changes to provincial powers without the provinces' consent:
The effect of the position taken by the Attorney General of Canada is that the two Houses of Parliament have unfettered control of a triggering mechanism by means of which they can cause the B.N.A. Act to be amended in any way they desire. It was frankly conceded in argument that there were no limits of any kind upon the type of amendment that could be made in this fashion. In our opinion, this argument in essence maintains that the provinces have since, at the latest 1931, owed their continued existence not to their constitutional 60 Now the Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 15.
Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 788.
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Id., at 815.
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Id. It so found, because "in the one hundred and fourteen years since Confederation the Senate and House of Commons of Canada have never sought, without the consent of the provinces, to obtain such an amendment nor, apparently, has that possibility ever been contemplated": id.
powers expressed in the B.N.A. Act, but to the federal Parliament's sufferance. 64 In answering "no" -that Parliament lacked the power to pass the resolution at issue -the dissent expressly invoked the Supreme Court's duty to uphold the Constitution's basic structure:
This Court, since its inception, has been active in reviewing the constitutionality of both federal and provincial legislation. This role has generally been concerned with the interpretation of the express terms of the B.N.A. Act. However, on occasions, this Court has had to consider issues for which the B.N.A. Act offered no answer. In each case, this Court has denied the assertion of any power which would offend against the basic principles of the Constitution.
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There was thus a clear difference between the majority and dissenting opinions about the appropriate focus of Question 3 (and the relevant part of Question B); 66 the extent to which role of the U.K. Parliament could be considered; and the extent to which extra-statutory considerations would apply.
Of course, the question about convention commanded the most attention. The issue was put forward in Question 2 of the Manitoba and Newfoundland References, and in the remaining part of Question B from the Quebec Reference. Here the Court also divided, but more narrowly. Only three justices who held there was no legal impediment also found that there was no convention requiring provincial consent. The remaining justices joined with Martland and Ritchie JJ. who concluded that there was indeed such a convention.
Interestingly, even the two justices dissenting on the convention issue decided to answer the question (while recognizing its challenges):
[N]o legal question is raised in the questions under consideration in these reasons and, ordinarily, the Court would not undertake to answer them for it is not the function of the Court to go beyond legal determinations. Because of the unusual nature of these References and because the issues raised in the questions now before us were argued at some length before the Court and have become the subject of the reasons of the majority, with which, with the utmost deference, we cannot agree, 64 Id., at 839-40.
Id., at 841.
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These questions asked whether amendments affecting provincial powers require provinicial consent. The questions are reproduced in the text accompanying notes 40 and 42, supra.
